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FIRST DAY         SECTION ONE 
 
 VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
 Roanoke, Virginia  - July 28, 2009 
                                   
You MUST write your answer to Questions 1 and 2 in WHITE Answer Booklet A 
1.  In 2000, Ben Caldwell, a resident of the County of Roanoke, Virginia executed a 
valid will by which he left his entire estate to his wife Nancy.  The will named Nancy as Executor.  
Ben and Nancy had three adult children of their marriage: George, Wiley, and Polly, none of whom 
was mentioned in Ben’s will.  George died in an automobile accident in 2006, survived by his wife, 
Mary, and two minor children, Ken and Julie. 
 
 Ben died on June 30, 2009. Nancy, who was seriously ill at the time of Ben’s death, died on 
July 25, 2009, before Ben’s will was offered for probate.  Nancy died without a will.  Ben and 
Nancy were survived by their two children, Wiley and Polly, and by Mary and her two minor 
children, Ken and Julie. 
 
 Ben died with interests in the following assets:  
• A joint checking account containing $30,000 held in the names of Ben and Nancy as joint 
tenants with the right of survivorship.  
• A family home valued at $250,000 held as tenants by the entirety with the right of 
survivorship.   
• Rights as sole beneficiary in a trust created by his grandparents, from which he received 
all of the income.  The trust instrument provided that the corpus would be distributed to 
Ben’s children upon Ben’s death.  The corpus of the trust at the time of Ben’s death was 
$9,500,000, and there was accumulated, undistributed income of an additional $25,000.   
• A 2007 Cadillac titled in his name and valued at $20,000. 
 
 When Nancy died, her estate consisted of $250,000 she had inherited from her parents and 
which she held in her sole name in a separate account, and such other assets as she received as a 
consequence of Ben’s death. 
 
(a) What is the title of the person who will manage Ben’s estate and how will that 
person be selected?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) What is the title of the person who will manage Nancy’s estate and how will that 
person be selected?  Explain fully. 
 
(c) Which of the assets mentioned in the facts given above must be included in the 
inventory of Ben’s estate, and which ones should not be included?  Explain fully. 
 
(d) Which of the assets mentioned in the facts given above must be included in the 
inventory of Nancy’s estate?  Explain fully. 
 
(e) Who is entitled to receive a share of Nancy’s estate and in what proportions?  
Explain fully. 
  
Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #1 above in the WHITE Booklet A 
 *  *  *  *  * 
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2. Tony, a self-employed building contractor, owned three parcels of real property in  
Bristol, Virginia.  The parcels had been appraised by an independent appraiser at a value of  
$125,000 each.  They were assessed for taxation purposes by the City of Bristol at $90,000 each.  
Title to Parcel 1 was held by Tony and his wife, Paula, as tenants by the entireties.  The other parcels 
were unencumbered and owned by Tony in fee simple. 
 
 Tony’s contracting business had slowed to a halt.  Aside from the parcels, Tony has no assets 
other than some building equipment, and he relies for living expenses on Paula’s salary as a librarian 
at the Bristol Public Library.  He owes creditors cumulatively $300,000, including $200,000 he owes 
to the Bank of Commerce (“Bank”).  Bank had lately been pressing Tony to reduce the debt.   
 
 On April 15, Tony received a letter from Bank’s attorney demanding that Tony either make a 
“substantial payment” on the outstanding balance or give Bank deeds of trust on the three parcels as 
security for the debt. 
 
 On April 30, Tony and Paula executed and recorded a deed conveying Parcel 1 to Paula in 
exchange for a payment of $500. 
 
 On May 1, when Bank learned of this transaction, it commenced suit to recover the full 
$200,000 owed by Tony. 
 
 On May 5, Tony executed a deed of trust on Parcel 2 in favor of his father to secure a 
$45,000 unpaid loan that his father had made to him two years earlier. 
 
 Also on May 5, Tony conveyed Parcel 3 to his friend, Alfred, in exchange for a promissory 
note for $100,000 payable in a single lump sum payment due five years from the date of the note.  In 
the deed of conveyance, Tony retained the right to repurchase Parcel 3 for $100,000 at any time 
during the same five years. 
 
 Bank then amended its complaint to pray for an order setting aside the deed to Paula on 
Parcel 1, the deed of trust to Tony’s father on Parcel 2, and the deed to Alfred on Parcel 3.  In his 
answer, Tony denied that Bank has the right to have those conveyances set aside. 
 
What arguments should Bank make in support of its prayer to set aside each of the 
conveyances, what arguments should Tony make in opposition, and how should the court rule 
on each?  Explain fully. 
 
Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #2 above in the WHITE Booklet A 
*  *  *  * * 
 
  Now MOVE to the YELLOW Answer Booklet B   
 
You MUST write your answer to Questions 3 and 4 in YELLOW Answer Booklet B 
 3. On New Year’s Eve, Officer Bradford responded to the site of an automobile accident 
on a state highway in the City of Covington, Virginia.  The driver of one of the cars was severely 
injured and had been taken by ambulance to the nearest hospital.  Jabo, the driver of the other car, 
was still at the scene of the accident.  When Officer Bradford asked Jabo for his driver’s license, 
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Jabo produced a picture ID card and explained sheepishly that his driver’s license had been 
suspended for 90 days three weeks earlier and that the car he was driving belonged to his next door 
neighbor, who had lent it to him so he could take his pet dog to the veterinarian.  The dog had 
suffered a broken hind leg when a car ran over it. 
 
 Officer Bradford then administratively impounded the car Jabo was driving and issued a 
citation and summons, charging Jabo with a violation of the following Virginia statute: 
 
  Section 46:  Driving while license suspended.   (A)  No resident  
  whose driver’s license has been suspended shall thereafter drive  
  a motor vehicle on any highway in the Commonwealth until the  
  period of such suspension has terminated. Violation of this  
  subsection is a misdemeanor, the penalty for which shall be a 
  term of confinement of 10 days in jail, except that the court shall 
  not impose the minimum term of confinement for violation of this    
  subsection where operation of the motor vehicle occurred in a  
situation of apparent extreme emergency which requires such  
operation to save life or limb. 
 
(B) In addition to any other penalty provided by this section,  
any motor vehicle that has been administratively impounded  
may in the discretion of the court be impounded for an additional 
period of up to 90 days.  However, if at the time of the violation 
the offender was driving a motor vehicle owned by another  
person, the court shall have no jurisdiction over such motor 
vehicle. 
 
(C) Upon conviction of a violation of subsection A, the court 
shall suspend the person’s driver’s license for an additional 
period equal to the period for which it had been previously 
suspended.   
 
 On January 30, Jabo appeared before the Covington General District Court.  Officer Bradford 
testified as to what Jabo had told him at the scene of the accident.  Jabo then entered a plea of guilty 
to the offense, a misdemeanor.  The court imposed a 10-day jail sentence, ordered the car impounded 
for an additional 90 days, and suspended Jabo’s license for an additional 90 days. 
 
 Jabo’s attorney filed a motion to vacate the court’s imposition of the 10-day jail sentence, the 
impoundment of the car, and the additional 90-day suspension on the ground that each of those 
actions exceeded the court’s power under Section 46. 
 
 Following Jabo’s conviction, Officer Bradford discovered that Jabo had previously been 
convicted of driving under the influence and had been adjudicated an habitual offender. 
 
 The Commonwealth’s Attorney indicted Jabo for violation of the following Virginia statute: 
 
Section 48:  Operation of a motor vehicle by an habitual  
offender prohibited.  (A)  It shall be unlawful for any person  
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adjudicated an habitual offender to drive any motor vehicle on the  
highways of the Commonwealth while the revocation or  
suspension of the person’s driving privilege remains in effect. 
 
(B) Any person found to be an habitual offender under this  
article, who is thereafter convicted of driving a motor vehicle 
in the Commonwealth while the revocation or suspension 
determination is in effect shall be punished as follows: 
 
   *  *  * 
(2) If such driving of itself endangers the life, limb, or property 
of another and the person has previously been convicted of  
driving while under the influence, such person shall be guilty of 
a felony punishable by confinement in a state correctional 
facility for not less than one year nor more than five years. 
 
 At the commencement in the Covington Circuit Court of Jabo’s trial on the indictment, after 
the first juror was sworn, Jabo’s attorney introduced evidence of Jabo’s conviction under Section 46 
in the General District Court and moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that trial on the 
Section 48 charges unlawfully subjected Jabo to double jeopardy. 
 
(a) How should the General District Court rule on each part of Jabo’s motion to 
vacate?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) How should the Circuit Court rule on Jabo’s motion to dismiss the indictment?  
Explain fully. 
 
Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #3 above in YELLOW Booklet B 
 
 *  *  *  *  * 
4. Paula Pane, a thirty-two year old mother of three children, was injured in a vehicular 
collision in Fairfax, Virginia when her automobile was struck from behind by an expensive sports 
car operated by Ronny Church.  Ronny is a notorious raconteur whose name often appears in local 
newspaper gossip columns and who was once quoted as having said, “I’ve never worked a day in my 
life, and I’m proud of it.”  Ronny had inherited a sizeable fortune and, in fact, had never worked. 
Paula sued Ronny in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia for $500,000 in 
compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages, alleging that Ronny’s gross negligence in 
operating his own motor vehicle was the proximate cause of the collision, which resulted in her 
personal injuries, including the pain and suffering she has experienced.  Ronny denied liability, and 
the case proceeded to trial before a jury.  The property damage claims had been settled separately by 
the parties’ insurance companies. 
 At trial, the evidence established the following facts:  Paula was stopped in the correct lane 
waiting to make a proper turn when Ronny’s car struck hers.  Immediately prior to the time of 
collision, Ronny was exceeding the posted speed limit by at least 10 miles per hour and was abruptly 
changing lanes.  Paula’s physician testified that Paula suffered a sprain of the muscles and the 
ligaments involving the neck and upper back, that there were no broken bones, but that, because of 
extreme discomfort, Paula was required to wear a foam collar, take pain medication, and undergo 
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physical therapy for several months.  He did not feel that she had any permanent disability and that 
as of the trial date she had no symptoms relative to her injured area.  Paula’s out-of-pocket expenses 
in connection with her injuries were $6,755, almost all of which represented the cost of medication, 
hospitalization, and healthcare provider fees.  As Paula was unemployed, there was no claim for lost 
wages. 
During a recess on the first day of the two-day trial, Frank, Paula’s father, forgetting 
momentarily the general admonition of the trial judge, which was announced to all witnesses and 
parties, not to converse with any juror until the case is over, struck up a conversation with one juror 
about the weather and gardening.  At one point during that conversation, Frank lamented that he 
“just hadn’t time this year to do everything I regularly do in the garden, because I’ve been 
babysitting the grandkids pretty much full time since Paula’s accident.” 
The jury deliberated for less than an hour and returned a verdict for $450,000 in 
compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages. 
In interviewing a juror after the trial, Ronny learned that the verdict had been based on a vote 
of six to one.  The dissenting juror, who was the one Ronny interviewed, said that, although she 
agreed with all the other jurors that Ronny had been grossly negligent, she had “refused to go along 
because the amount was way out of line only because of Ronny’s reputation as a rich playboy.”  This 
juror also told Ronny about Frank’s conversation with one of the other jurors. 
Based on this information, Ronny timely filed the following motions asking for a new trial on 
all issues, including liability and damages:  
(1) For a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous;  
(2) For a new trial on the ground of Frank’s conversation with one of the jurors; and  
(3) For a new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive. 
 The judge asks you, as her law clerk, to prepare a memorandum explaining fully your 
answers to the following questions: 
(a) Must the court grant a new trial based on the less-than-unanimous verdict?  
(b) Must the court grant a new trial because of Frank’s conversation with the juror? 
(c) What is the standard for making the determination that a verdict is excessive, 
and, in the event the court determines that the verdict was, in fact, excessive, 
must the court grant a new trial, or does it have any other options? 
(d) In the event the court grants a new trial solely on the ground that the verdict was 
excessive, should the court grant the new trial on all issues or should it limit the 
new trial to the issue of damages? 
Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #4 above in YELLOW Booklet B 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
  Now MOVE to Salmon colored Answer Booklet C   
 
 You MUST write your answer to Question 5 in Salmon Answer Booklet C 
5. Maddy, who recently graduated from college and is joining her friend Sophia on a 
celebratory, two-week vacation trip to Europe, left her automobile at the home of Sophia’s parents in 
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Vienna, Virginia, since that is reasonably convenient to Dulles International Airport.  As Maddy and 
Sophia were leaving for the airport, Maddy handed over her automobile keys to Sophia’s father, AJ, 
asking him to “keep an eye on my car” and saying he could move it “if necessary” while she and 
Sophia were traveling out of the country. 
Several days later, AJ, who was frustrated that the egress for his own automobile to exit from 
his driveway was blocked by a repairman’s van, drove Maddy’s automobile to work.  Because he 
was late for a meeting and not thinking about what he was doing, AJ inadvertently parked Maddy’s 
automobile in a “no parking/towing enforced” zone in the parking garage connected to the office 
building where he worked. 
When AJ returned that evening to where he had parked Maddy’s automobile, he learned that 
it had been towed by Bud’s Towing, an independent contractor retained by Office Building 
Corporation (“OBC”), the owner of the office building and parking garage.   
AJ went to Bud’s impoundment lot in Vienna, Virginia and paid the towing fee to Bud.  AJ 
received a receipt, which authorized release of the car to him.  As AJ began to drive off the towing 
company’s property, he noticed that the automobile’s radio was missing.  Because AJ had listened to 
the radio that morning on the way to work, he knew that it must have been in the car when he parked 
it.  In fact, the radio had been removed while the car was in Bud’s possession.  When AJ confronted 
Bud and demanded that the radio be replaced, Bud said “Listen, once I park a car in my storage lot, I 
don’t pay attention to it any more after that.  If you’re towed from a no parking zone to my place, it’s 
your problem.”  When AJ began to protest, Bud, who is the sole owner of the towing company, just 
grinned and pointed to the language on the back of AJ’s receipt for the towing charges, which stated: 
 
“Bud’s Towing is not responsible for loss or damages to your 
property, no matter what the reason.  Have a nice day." 
 
AJ asks you the following questions: 
 
(a) Does AJ have any liability to Maddy for the missing radio?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) Does Bud’s Towing have any liability for the missing radio?  Explain fully. 
 




Reminder:  You MUST answer Question #5 above in Salmon Booklet C 
 
 *  *  *  *  * 
  
 
END OF SECTION ONE 
  
 
